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Abstract
In this note, we deﬁne an abstract ﬁle system as a partial function from (absolute) paths to data. Such a
ﬁle system determines the set of valid paths. It allows the ﬁle system to be read and written at a valid path,
and it allows the system to be modiﬁed by the Unix operations for removal (rm), making of directories
(mkdir), and moving (mv). We present abstract deﬁnitions (axioms) for these operations.
This speciﬁcation is reﬁned towards a pointer implementation. To mitigate the problems attached to partial
functions, we do this in two steps. First a reﬁnement towards a pointer implementation with total functions,
followed by one that allows partial functions. These two reﬁnements are proved correct by means of a number
of invariants. Indeed, the insight gained mainly consists of the invariants of the pointer implementation
that are needed for the reﬁnement functions.
Finally, each of the three speciﬁcation levels is enriched with a permission system for reading, writing, or
executing, and the reﬁnement relations between these permission systems are explored.
Keywords: File System, Speciﬁcation, Veriﬁcation, Reﬁnement, Permission System, Theorem Proving.
1 Introduction
What is a hierarchical ﬁle system? Although most of us seem to know the answer,
it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a deﬁnition, let alone a speciﬁcation. In [1], e.g., we read: “Like
most modern operating systems, UNIX organizes its ﬁle system as a hierarchy of
directories” and “directories, which contain information about a set of ﬁles and are
used to locate a ﬁle by its name.” If this answers the question for the impatient, it
does not yield a speciﬁcation. Yet, a speciﬁcation is needed when we want to verify
the correctness of an implementation.
As ﬁle systems are at the core of the operating system kernel, even a simple error
can cause a crash of the system, possibly resulting in loss of stored data [2]. File
system errors are among the most dangerous errors because they can cause loss of
persistent data stored on the disk. The growing size and complexity of ﬁle systems
1 Email:w.h.hesselink@rug.nl
2 Email:m.i.ullah@rug.nl
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 259 (2009) 67–85
1571-0661© 2009 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2009.12.018
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
indicates the need of veriﬁcation of such systems for ensuring reliability. It is very
diﬃcult to ensure reliability by testing techniques.
Testing and simulation are traditional techniques to check that the software
written is correct with respect to its functionality [3]. Many testing techniques are
available which help in eliminating coding errors. However, very few defects in end
products are due to coding errors. For example, in 197 critical faults, detected
during the testing phase of the Voyager and Galileo spacecraft, just three of them
were coding errors. About 50% of the faults were traced to requirements, 25% to
design, and the rest due to other errors. This is a typical example of a prevalent
problem that the majority of faults in software arise in requirements and design
and very few occur due to coding. Furthermore, such techniques do not cover all
possible behaviors of the system [4].
Formal veriﬁcation uses the mathematical techniques for ensuring the design to
conform to the functional correctness. It can be applied to designs described for
many diﬀerent levels of abstraction [5]. It helps in eliminating errors in the design
which can cause disaster at later stages.
In this paper, we formalize the most rudimentary aspects of a hierarchical ﬁle
system: only reading and writing ﬁles, deleting them, creating them, and moving
them. We do this in a top-down fashion, starting with the point of view of a user
who does not want to know anything of the implementation. This is reﬁned into a
version with directories that hold subdirectories.
When formalizing this, one encounters the problem of partial functions. In the
ﬁrst reﬁnement step this is ignored by forcing the functions to be total. In the
second reﬁnement step, we recognize the inherent partiality of our functions. From
the conceptual point of view, this may seem superﬂuous. For implementations,
however, it is crucial because this partiality corresponds to the potential occurrence
of unallocated pointers in the implementation.
We use the proof assistant PVS [6] for our formalization and the veriﬁcation of
the reﬁnement relations. The PVS proof script of our deﬁnitions, theorems, and
proofs is available at [7]. Our notation is partially based on PVS syntax, but we
also use concepts from Haskell, and standard mathematical notations.
The primary contribution is to formally deﬁne a ﬁle system at a very high level
with its ﬁve operations of reading and writing ﬁles, and creating, deleting and
moving ﬁles and directories, and to reﬁne this speciﬁcation in two steps to a system
with ﬁle identiﬁers as pointers, and to mechanically verify the reﬁnement relations.
1.1 Related work
The 15 year old grand challenge in software veriﬁcation proposed by Hoare in [8] was
reﬁned by Joshi and Holzmann in [9] to a mini-challenge to build a small veriﬁable
ﬁle system for ﬂash memory. The current status of the grand challenge is discussed
in [10]. Earlier, in [11], C. Morgan and B. Sufrin proposed abstract speciﬁcations
of some of the data structures in the UNIX ﬁle system. The POSIX ﬁle store us-
ing Z/Eves with reﬁnements based on [11] is described in [12,13]. The paper [12]
provides a concrete implementation of an abstract speciﬁcation by means of Java
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HashMaps, taken from JML annotations given in [14]. Wenzel [15] analyses aspects
of the Unix ﬁle system security with the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. Galloway et
al. [16] verify the existing Linux Virtual File System (VFS) using model checking
techniques by extracting and validating a model from an available implementation
of VFS. Yang et al. [2] build their own model checker “FiSC” to ﬁnd serious ﬁle
system errors. This paper shows that even the most popular ﬁle systems contain
serious bugs which can cause damage to the stored data. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to consider correctness proofs even of existing ﬁle system implementations. In
this regard, a correctness proof of operations like reading and writing in a Unix
based ﬁle system is presented in [17] using Athena, an interactive theorem-proving
environment.
In 2008, inspired by Hughes’ speciﬁcation [18] of a visual ﬁle system in Z, Dam-
choom, Butler, and Abrial [19] have modeled a tree structured ﬁle system in Event-
B and Rodin. This paper gives one of the ﬁrst speciﬁcations of a hierarchical ﬁle
system in which the tree structure can be modiﬁed. It is close to our work. An
important diﬀerence, however, is that it is more abstract in the sense that it ignores
ﬁle names and paths, which are central concepts in our speciﬁcations.
1.2 Overview
In section 2, we construct an abstract speciﬁcation of a hierarchical ﬁle system based
on the “user point of view”. Section 3 contains the ﬁrst reﬁnement step towards a
ﬁle system with pointers that are modelled as total functions. Section 4 presents
the second reﬁnement step to a system with pointers modelled as partial functions.
In section 5, we indicate how ﬁle permissions as used in Unix can be speciﬁed in
our set-up. Conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2 The User’s Point of View
From the user’s point of view, a ﬁle store associates a ﬁle or a directory to an
absolute path. For simplicity, we do not distinguish ﬁles and directories, i.e., we
allow a ﬁle to be associated to a directory. In some later reﬁnement, we may want
to make the distinction, e.g., by restricting the data associated to a directory.
A path is thus a ﬁnite sequence of (directory) names, and the type of paths is
deﬁned by
Path = finite sequence[Name] .
A store determines the valid paths, and the associated data for each valid path. We
therefore deﬁne an abstract store as a partial function from Path to Data, according
to the following type deﬁnition:
StoreA = [Path → lift[Data]] ,
where we use the PVS deﬁnition lift[X] = X ∪ {⊥}. The set of valid paths for an
abstract store x is given by
Valid(x) = {p | x(p) = ⊥} .
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We use the operator ++ for concatenation of paths as ﬁnite sequences. This
operator is associative, i.e., (p ++ q) ++ r = p ++(q ++ r), and has the empty path
ε as two-sided unit, i.e., ε ++ p = p = p ++ ε. Path p is called a preﬁx of q, with
notation p  q, iﬀ there is a path r with p ++ r = q. Relation  is an ordering of
the set Path, i.e., it is reﬂexive and transitive, and p  q  p implies p = q.
The empty path ε holds the root of the ﬁle system and should therefore always
be valid. A preﬁx of a valid path should be valid. We therefore deﬁne a store x to
be legitimate if
ε ∈ Valid(x) ∧ (∀ p, q : p  q ∧ q ∈ Valid(x) ⇒ p ∈ Valid(x)) .
Reading the data of a path p in store x is just asking for x(p), which yields ⊥
iﬀ p /∈ Valid(x).
Writing a ﬁle means modifying the data according to some recipe, e.g., writing
from a certain oﬀset. Such a recipe can be regarded as an element of the type
Modiﬁer = [Data → Data] .
Writing with modiﬁer m at path p in store x is only successful when p is valid;
otherwise nothing happens. For simplicity, we do not yet include error messages for
failure. We therefore lift every modiﬁer m to lift[Data] by deﬁning m(⊥) = ⊥
and deﬁne writing by:
write : [Path ×Modiﬁer × StoreA → StoreA] ,
write(p,m, x) = (x with [(p) := m(x(p))]) ,
or equivalently: write(p,m, x)(q) = (q = p ? m(x(p)) : x(q)) .
Here we use the with notation of PVS for function modiﬁcation, with a C-like
conditional expression as an alternative. If x is legitimate, then write(p,m, x) is
also legitimate.
Remark 2.1 In an earlier version, the second argument of write was the new value
for x(p), of type Data. This was not expressive enough, because in actual ﬁle
systems, writing often means replacing a part of the ﬁle or appending something to
a ﬁle. All this can be expressed by means of modiﬁers.
The Unix function ls associates to a given store x and a valid path p the set of
names n that occur in the directory of p. We need to distinguish an empty directory
from a nonexistent one. We therefore deﬁne:
ls : [Path × StoreA→ lift[P[Name]]] ,
ls(p, x) = (p ∈ Valid(x) ? {n | p ++ n ∈ Valid(x)} : ⊥) ,
where a name n is implicitly coerced to a singleton list. If the path is not valid, ls
yields ⊥ .
We specify a function create that makes a new entry with data d in the store for
a given path p. It does so only when path p is not yet valid and has a valid parent
directory. Otherwise, create has no eﬀect. Here, for a nonempty path p, the parent
path parent(p) is deﬁned as the unique maximal strict preﬁx of p, which satisﬁes
|parent(p)| = |p| − 1, where |p| stands for the length of p.
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create : [Path ×Data × StoreA → StoreA] ,
create(p, d, x) =
(x(p) = ⊥ ∨ x(parent(p)) = ⊥ ? x : x with [(p) := d]) .
If store x is legitimate, the store y = create(p, d, x) is legitimate because Valid(y) =
Valid(x) ∪ {p}.
Deletion of a path p from an abstract store x also deletes all descendant direc-
tories. It is therefore speciﬁed by
deleteG : [Path × StoreA→ StoreA] ,
deleteG(p, x)(q) = (p  q ? ⊥ : x(q)) .
If store x is legitimate and p = ε, the store y = deleteG(p, x) is legitimate because
Valid(y) = Valid(x) \ {q | p  q}.
Moving is more complicated. A move from p to q has the eﬀect that the old
directory q (if it was valid) is completely overwritten by p, whereas the old directory
p disappears. Let store y = moveG(p, q, x) be the result of the move. For a path r
of the form r = q ++ s, we therefore have y(r) = x(p ++ s). For q  r, this implies
y(r) = x(p ++ drop(|q|, r)) where drop(k, r) is the suﬃx of r obtained by removing
the ﬁrst k elements. We thus obtain:
moveG : [Path × Path × StoreA → StoreA] ,
moveG(p, q, x)(r) =
( q  r ? x(p ++ drop(|q|, r))
: p  r ? ⊥
: x(r) ) .
It is easy to see that moveG(p, p, x) = x for any x and p. If store x is legitimate
and p /∈ Valid(x), then moveG(p, q, x) = deleteG(q, x).
Theorem 2.2 Let x be a legitimate abstract store. Assume that q = ε and p 
parent(q), and that parent(q) ∈ Valid(x). Then move(p, q, x) is legitimate.
Because of the case distinctions in the deﬁnition of move, the proof of this result
is rather complicated. A key step in the proof is the observation that, if q  s and
r  s and q  r, then r  parent(q).
On the other hand, when p ∈ Valid(x) is a strict preﬁx of q, then y = move(p, q, x)
satisﬁes y(p) = ⊥ and y(q) = x(p) = ⊥, so that store y is not legitimate.
We extended the names deleteG and moveG with G, because we need versions
of these functions that preserve legitimacy. We thus deﬁne
delete(p, x) = (p = ε ? x : deleteG(p, x)) ,
move(p, q, x) = ( x(p) = ⊥ ∨ q = ε ∨ x(parent(q)) = ⊥ ∨ p  q ? x
: moveG(p, q, x) ) .
These functions delete and move indeed preserve legitimacy. With respect to move,
we are slightly more restrictive than needed for Theorem 2.1. We let move do
nothing if p is not valid or if p is a preﬁx of q itself, because moving is not useful if
p is not valid or equal to q.
We ﬁnally specify an initial store with arbitrary data d and an empty directory:
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initstoreA : [Data → StoreA] ,
initstoreA(d)(p) = (p = ε ? d : ⊥) .
It is easy to see that initstoreA(d) is legitimate.
3 Reﬁning the Store
The usual implementation of a ﬁle store is by means of the standard pointer im-
plementation of a tree. We use a simple type Fid of ﬁle identiﬁers as the pointer
type. The root of the tree is given by a constant rootId ∈ Fid. For now, we deﬁne
a directory to be a total function that associates ﬁle identiﬁers to names. We use a
constant null ∈ Fid as a default ﬁle identiﬁer for nonoccurring names. We postulate
that rootId = null.
We thus allow nodes also for invalid paths. They always hold a directory, which
may be empty, and they may have data. A total store is a total function from ﬁle
identiﬁers to nodes.
DirT = [Name → Fid] ,
NodeT = [# data : lift[Data] , dir : DirT #] ,
StoreT = [Fid → NodeT] .
Here [# and #] are constructors for record types as used in PVS. The corresponding
element constructors are (# and #) used below. For a node v, we write v.data and
v.dir for its data and its directory. At this point, the nodes are more general than
usual. Later on, we may want to impose conditions on the data for a node that
contains a nonempty directory. A new node with data d and without children is
declared by
nodeT(d) = (# data := d , dir := (λ n : null) #) .
The initial store is deﬁned by
initstoreT(d) = (λ f : f = rootId ? nodeT(d) : nodeT(⊥)) .
Since a store x is supposed to be a total function, we postulate an invariant to
ensure that no data are hidden in or beyond null, viz.
J0(x) : x(null) = nodeT(⊥) .
The ﬁle identiﬁer associated to a path in a given store is deﬁned recursively.
For this purpose, we deﬁne a function last : [Path → Name] such that, for every
nonempty path p, we have
p = parent(p) ++ last(p) .
The ﬁle identiﬁer of a path is given by the recursive lookup function L deﬁned by:
L : [Path × StoreT → Fid] ,
L(p, x) = ( p = ε ? rootId : x(L(parent(p), x)).dir(last(p)) ) .
We only want to ﬁnd data = ⊥ at the node of null. This is expressed in the invariant
J1(x) : ∀ p : x(L(p, x)).data = ⊥ ⇒ L(p, x) = null .
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The abstraction function from total stores to abstract stores is deﬁned by
abstract : [StoreT → StoreA] ,
abstract(x)(p) = x(L(p, x)).data .
It is straightforward to prove that abstract(initstoreT(d)) = initstoreA(d). Using
J0(x) and J1(x), one can easily prove
p ∈ Valid(abstract(x)) ≡ L(p, x) = null .
Using invariant J0, we prove that
L(p, x) = null ∧ p  q ⇒ L(q, x) = null .
Using the postulate rootId = null, this implies that abstract(x) is legitimate.
Reading is deﬁned by
read(p, x) = abstract(x)(p) = x(L(p, x)).data .
The contents of a directory are found by means of function ls deﬁned by
ls(p, x) = (L(p, x) = null ? ⊥ : ls(x(L(p, x)).dir)) , where
ls(di) = {n ∈ Name | di(n) = null} .
Using the invariants J0 and J1, it is easy to prove the reﬁnement theorem that
ls(p, abstract(x)) = ls(p, x).
For writing, we use the PVS conventions for modifying functional structures.
We thus deﬁne:
write(p,m, x) =
( L(p, x) = null ? x
: x with [(L(p, x)).data := m(x(L(p, x)).data)] ) .
Writing does not change L, because writing aﬀects only ﬁeld data, while L only
uses ﬁeld dir. In other words, we have the easy result that
L(q,write(p,m, x)) = L(q, x) .
The speciﬁcation of section 2 implies that writing at a path p only aﬀects path p.
This implies that the total store must be a tree, in the sense that diﬀerent valid
paths have diﬀerent ﬁle identiﬁers. This is postulated in the invariant:
J2(x) : ∀ p, q : L(p, x) = L(q, x) = null ⇒ p = q .
We now prove
Theorem 3.1 Assume J0(x), J1(x), and J2(x). Then we have
abstract(write(p,m, x)) = write(p,m, abstract(x)).
The challenge is now to deﬁne implementation functions for create, delete, and
move that behave in the same way as the corresponding functions on StoreA, and
to prove such facts.
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3.1 Removals from the store
Given x : StoreT, a path p can only be deleted from it if it is not the root and it is
valid. Deletion then amounts to removing its last name from its parent directory:
delete(p, x) =
( p = ε ? x : x with [ (pp).dir(last(p)) := null ] )
where pp = L(parent(p), x).
We postpone garbage collection to section 3.4.
It turns out that the invariants obtained above are enough to prove:
Theorem 3.2 Assume that J0(x) and J2(x). Then we have abstract(delete(p, x)) =
delete(p, abstract(x)).
Proof. We ﬁrst claim that
(0) L(q,delete(p, x)) =
(p = ε ∧ p  q ? null : L(q, x)) .
This is proved by induction on the length of q, because L is deﬁned recursively. The
invariant J2 is needed because store x is modiﬁed at pp.dir(last(p)), and at several
points we therefore need to ensure that the arguments we are interested in diﬀer
from this.
We verify the ﬁnal step by observing for every path q:
abstract(delete(p, x))(q)
= { deﬁnition of abstract; write y = delete(p, x) }
y(L(q, y)).data
= { (0) and J0 for y }
(p = ε ∧ p  q ? ⊥ : y(L(q, x)).data)
= { x and y are equal on data }
(p = ε ∧ p  q ? ⊥ : x(L(q, x)).data))
= { deﬁnitions of delete and abstract }
delete(p, abstract(x))(q) .
This completes the proof. 
3.2 Creating new entries
In order to preserve J2 when creating new entries in the store, we need an unbounded
heap. We formally ensure this by postulating that the type Fid is inﬁnite and that
the stores we consider are all ﬁnite, according to the invariant
J3(x) : #range(x) < ∞ , where
range(x) = {null, rootId} ∪ {f ∈ Fid | ∃ g, n : f = x(g).dir(n)} .
This enables us to deﬁne a choice function new : StoreT → Fid with the property:
(1) J3(x) ⇒ new(x) /∈ range(x) .
Function create at this level of abstraction is deﬁned by
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create(p, d, x) =
( pp = null ∨ L(x, p) = null ? x
: x with [ (pp).dir(last(p)) := ln , (ln) := nodeT(d) ] )
where pp = L(parent(p), x) and ln = new(x).
Function create satisﬁes the reﬁnement theorem:
Theorem 3.3 Assume that J0(x) ∧ J2(x) ∧ J3(x). Then we have
abstract(create(p, d, x)) = create(p, d, abstract(x)).
Proof. One ﬁrst proves that the failure conditions of both versions of create are
equivalent, because abstract(x)(q) = ⊥ if and only if L(x, q) = null. Now assume
both versions modify the store. We then prove, by induction on the length of q,
that
(2) L(q, create(p, d, x)) =
( q = p = ε ∧ L(parent(p), x) = null = L(p, x) ? new(x)
: L(q, x) ) .
We verify the ﬁnal step by observing for every path q:
abstract(create(p, d, x))(q)
= { deﬁnition of abstract; write y = create(p, d, x) }
y(L(q, y)).data
= { (2) }
( q = p = ε ∧ L(parent(p), x) = null = L(p, x) ? y(new(x)).data
: y(L(q, x)).data)
= { deﬁnition y and new ; L(q, x) = new(x) }
( q = p = ε ∧ L(parent(p), x) = null = L(p, x) ? d
: x(L(q, x)).data))
= { write x′ = abstract(x); deﬁnition of abstract }
( q = p = ε ∧ x′(parent(p)) = ⊥ = x′(p) ? d : x′(q))
= { abstract deﬁnition of create }
create(p, d, x′)(q) .
This completes the proof. 
3.3 Moving ﬁles and directories
Function move at this level is deﬁned by:
move(p, q, x) =
( q = ε ∨ p  q ∨ L(p, x) = null ∨ qq = null ? x
: x with [(qq).dir(last(q)) := L(p, x) ,
(pp).dir(last(p)) := null ] )
where qq = L(parent(q), x) and pp = L(parent(p), x)
Note that J2(x) implies that the ﬁle identiﬁers pp and qq are equal if and only if p
and q have the same parent. If so, then p  q implies that last(p) and last(q) diﬀer.
The reﬁnement theorem for move is:
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Theorem 3.4 Assume that J0(x) ∧ J1(x) ∧ J2(x). Then we have
abstract(move(p, q, x)) = move(p, q, abstract(x)).
We have proved this with PVS (see [7]). The structure of the proof is the same
as for delete and create. Due to the many case distinctions, it is cumbersome. We
omit it because it is not illuminating.
3.4 Garbage collection
Unreachable nodes in the tree are useless. Garbage collection amounts to the re-
moval of useless nodes. In the present context this is impossible because every store
x is a total function. The best we can do is minimize the unreachable nodes. This
is done as follows.
The set of reachable ﬁle identiﬁers is deﬁned by
reach(x) = {f | ∃ p : L(p, x) = f} .
As unreachable ﬁle identiﬁers are never inspected, we deﬁne garbage collection by
gc : [StoreT → StoreT] ,
gc(x)(f) = (f ∈ reach(x) ? x(f) : nodeT(⊥)) .
By a straightforward induction on the length of p, one proves that L(p, gc(x)) =
L(p, x) for all paths p. Having done this, one can easily prove that abstract(gc(x)) =
abstract(x). In words, garbage collection does not inﬂuence the meaning of the
store.
3.5 Proofs of the invariants
It is straightforward to prove that the operations write, delete, create, move, and
gc preserve the invariant J0, i.e., J0(x) implies J0(write(p,m, x)) for all x : StoreT,
and similarly for the other functions. The same is done for the invariant J1. Preser-
vation of J3 under these ﬁve operations follows from the fact that they add at most
one element (in the case of create) to the range of the store.
The invariant J2 uses function L, which is deﬁned recursively. We therefore
deﬁne two simpler invariants, which express that the ﬁle tree has no cycles and that
all occurring ﬁle identiﬁers = null are diﬀerent:
J2a(x) : ∀ f, n : x(f).dir(n) = rootId ,
J2b(x) : ∀ f, g,m, n : x(f).dir(m) = x(g).dir(n) = null ⇒ f = g ∧ m = n .
Here, f and g range over Fid and m and n range over Name. By induction on the
lengths of the paths, one proves that these two invariants, together with J0, imply
J2. It is fairly easy to prove that write, delete, move, and gc preserve the invariants
J2a and J2b. For create, we use J3 and formula (1).
Finally, it is straightforward to prove that initstoreT(d) satisﬁes the invariants
J0, J1, J2a, J2b, and J3.
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4 Implementing the Store
We now replace the total functions of the previous section by “ﬁnite maps”, i.e.,
partial functions with a ﬁnite domain. We thus use the types declared in:
DirI = [Name → lift[Fid]] ,
NodeI = [# data : Data , dir : DirI #] ,
StoreI = [Fid → lift[Node]] .
Working with partial functions in a theorem prover like PVS gives technical
diﬃculties that, from a conceptual point of view, seem inessential and distracting.
In the implementation, however, these diﬃculties correspond to the usual prob-
lems with unallocated pointers. It is therefore important to get it correct at the
theoretical level.
In our presentation here, we make one simpliﬁcation of the PVS code. If X
is a type, the PVS type lift[X] represents X ∪ {⊥}, but X is not a subset of
lift[X]. Instead, there is an injection up : [X → lift[X]] and an inverse coercion
down : [X ′ → X] where X ′ ⊆ lift[X] is the image of up. In the presentation below,
we suppress the functions up and down, and regard X and X ′ as identical.
We construct a reﬁnement function reﬁne from the present system to the one of
the previous section in:
reﬁne : [StoreI → StoreT] ,
reﬁne(x)(f) =
(x(f) = ⊥ ? nodeT(⊥)
: (# data := x(f).data ,dir := ψ ◦ (x(f).dir) #) )
where ψ(g) = (g = ⊥ ? null : g).
4.1 Reading and writing the store
The ﬁle identiﬁer null is no longer needed in the implementation, but we allow and
use it as an alias for ⊥ . We therefore deﬁne for x : StoreI the invariant:
K0(x) : x(null) = ⊥ .
On the other hand, we want that all other ﬁle identiﬁers used in the store hold
genuine nodes, as expressed in the invariant:
K1(x) : ∀ f ∈ range(x) ⇒ f = null ∨ x(f) = ⊥ , where
range(x) = {null, rootId} ∪ {f ∈ Fid | ∃ g, n : f = x(g).dir(n)} ,
where, by convention, x(g).dir(n) /∈ Fid when x(g) = ⊥ or x(g).dir(n) = ⊥ .
At this reﬁnement level, we use the lookup function L given by
L : [StoreI × Path → Fid] ,
L(p, x) = ( p = ε ? rootId
: x(L(parent(p), x)) = ⊥ ∨
x(L(parent(p), x)).dir(last(p)) = ⊥ ? null
: x(L(parent(p), x)).dir(last(p)) ) .
The invariants K0(x) and K1(x) imply the rule:
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K01(x) : L(p, x) = null ≡ x(L(p, x)) = ⊥ .
In PVS, reading store x : StoreI at path p is deﬁned by
read(p, x) = (x(L(p, x)) = ⊥ ? ⊥ : x(L(p, x)).data) .
A practical implementation would use the test L(p, x) = null rather than the equiv-
alent x(L(p, x)) = ⊥. Doing this in PVS, however, would raise the objection that
x(L(p, x)).data is deﬁned only if x(L(p, x)) = ⊥ . In other words, the function read
would only be deﬁned on the stores where K01 holds. Although we shall prove that
K01 holds for all reachable stores, we prefer to deﬁne read as a total function in
PVS and therefore use the deﬁnition above. The same argument applies to several
of the deﬁnitions below.
Using a straightforward induction on the length of path p, one can prove
L(p, x) = L(p, reﬁne(x)) .
This enables us to prove that K01(x) implies read(p, reﬁne(x)) = read(p, x).
On this level, function ls is deﬁned by
ls(p, x) = (x(L(p, x)) = ⊥ ? ⊥ : ls(x(L(p, x)).dir)) , where
ls(di) = {n ∈ Name | di(n) = ⊥ ∧ di(n) = null} .
Using the invariant K0, it is easy to prove the reﬁnement theorem that ls(p, reﬁne(x)) =
ls(p, x). Writing of store x is deﬁned by
write(p,m, x) =
( x(L(p, x)) = ⊥ ? x
: x with [(L(p, x)).data := m(x(L(p, x)).data)] ) .
Using K01(x), one can prove that reﬁne(write(p,m, x)) = write(p,m, reﬁne(x)).
4.2 Tree modiﬁcation
Analogously to the deﬁnition in section 3.1, here removal is deﬁned by
delete(p, x) =
( p = ε ∨ L(p, x) = null ? x
: x with [ (pp).dir(last(p)) := ⊥ ] )
where pp = L(parent(p), x).
Note that in the second branch, L(p, x) = null implies that x(L(parent(p), x)) = ⊥.
Therefore this node indeed has a directory that can be modiﬁed. The equality
reﬁne(delete(p, x)) = delete(p, reﬁne(x)) is proved with the invariant K01(x).
For making a directory, we again need ﬁniteness of the store as expressed in the
invariant
K2(x) : #range(x) < ∞ .
We can therefore deﬁne a function new : [Store → Fid] that satisﬁes new(x) /∈
range(x) for every x with K2(x). We need a diﬀerent node constructor (compare
section 3):
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nodeI(d) = (# data := d , dir := (λ n : ⊥) #) .
Analogously to section 3.2, a new node is created by
create(p, d, x) =
( x(pp) = ⊥ ∨ L(p, x) = null ? x
: x with [ (pp ).dir(last(p)) := ln , (ln) := node(d) ] )
where pp = L(parent(p), x) and ln = new(x).
It is easy to prove that range(reﬁne(x)) = range(x). We also get new(reﬁne(x)) =
new(x), because we can use the same choice function. Using K01(x), one can then
prove the equality reﬁne(create(p, d, x)) = create(p, d, reﬁne(x)).
Function move is deﬁned almost as in section 3.3:
move(p, q, x) =
( q = ε ∨ p  q ∨ L(p, x) = null ∨ x(qq) = ⊥ ? x
: x with [(qq).dir(last(q)) := L(p, x) ,
(pp).dir(last(p)) := ⊥ ] )
where qq = L(parent(q), x) and pp = L(parent(p), x).
At this point, the identiﬁcation of typeNode with a subtype of lift[Node] simpliﬁes
the presentation. Working in PVS, we need to make a case distinction whether the
ﬁle identiﬁers pp and qq are equal or diﬀer. Nevertheless, we formally proved the
equality reﬁne(move(p, q, x)) = move(p, q, reﬁne(x)), using the invariant K01.
The veriﬁcation that the invariants K0, K1, and K2 are preserved by the op-
erations write, delete, create, and move are straightforward. These invariants also
hold for the initial store deﬁned by
initstoreI(d) = (λ f : f = rootId ? nodeI(d) : ⊥) .
Moreover, reﬁne(initstoreI(d)) = initstoreT(d).
It follows that the composition abs = abstract ◦ reﬁne is a genuine reﬁnement
function Store → StoreA.
4.3 Garbage and garbage collection
Garbage collection is more useful at this level than in section 3.4. Again we deﬁne:
reach : [StoreI → P[Fid]] ,
reach(x) = {f | ∃ p : L(p, x) = f} .
Garbage collection now means removal of unreachable nodes:
gc : [StoreI → StoreI ] ,
gc(x)(f) = (f ∈ reach(x) ? x(f) : ⊥) .
As before, one ﬁrst proves that L(p, gc(x)) = L(p, x) for all paths p and x : StoreI .
Then it is, indeed, straightforward to prove that function gc preserves the three
invariants K0, K1, and K2.
It is easy to prove that reﬁne(gc(x)) = gc(reﬁne(x)). It follows that the com-
position abs : [StoreI → StoreA] satisﬁes abs(gc(x)) = abs(x) for all x : StoreI .
W.H. Hesselink, M.I. Lali / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 259 (2009) 67–85 79
5 File Permissions at Three Levels
File system permissions form a core issue in every operating system. Not all users
must be able to read and modify all data. We therefore overload the six ﬁle system
functions by adding a user as a new ﬁrst argument, where User is a new type,
uninterpreted for now. For the sake of orthogonality, we deviate somewhat from
the standard Unix conventions.
5.1 Permissions in the abstract system
We describe the ﬁle system permission model from the user’s point of view at the
abstract level. For the user, we have typical access types like reading, executing
and writing, and the owner can control the permissions to these operations. Fur-
thermore, there is the concept of a super user, who holds all access rights in the ﬁle
system.
We assume that the permissions attached to a node are encoded in the data of
the node by means of predicates:
px,pr,pw : P[User ×Data] ,
where px stands for the permission to execute, pr to read, and pw to write. We do
not go into details of how these permissions are represented in the data. Instead,
we concentrate on the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation that users can only access and
modify according to the permissions granted. As the functions px, pr, pw depend
on the user, they can also depend on the classiﬁcation of the user as creator of the
ﬁle or directory, as a member of the group, etc. We can therefore here ignore these
issues. As we need to apply these predicates in stores at a given path, we overload
them to
px,pr,pw : P[User × Path × StoreA] ,
px(u, p, x) = x(p) = ⊥ ∧ px(u, x(p)) ,
and similarly for pr and pw.
In case of ﬁles, readable, executable and writable means that the contents of a
ﬁle can be read, executed (if it is executable) and written. In case of directories,
readable corresponds to the listing of the directory entries, and executable means
that user is allowed to go into the directory, i.e., “change directory”. Writable
means the permission to create or remove entries in the given directory. Therefore,
for reading and writing in a ﬁle or directory at some path, the user needs execution
rights along the whole path in the ﬁle system [1, Section 2.8]. This implies that the
eﬀective permissions are slightly more complicated functions that depend on the
user, the path, and the store. We thus deﬁne:
pX ,pR,pW : P[User × Path × StoreA] ,
pX(u, p, x) = (∀ q : q  p ⇒ px(u, q, x) ,
pR(u, p, x) = pr(u, p, x) ∧ (p = ε ∨ pX(u,parent(p), x)) ,
pW(u, p, x) = pw(u, p, x) ∧ (p = ε ∨ pX(u,parent(p), x)) .
Here, by convention, parent(ε) = ε. In some Unix variants, write permission may
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imply or require read permission. This can be modelled by adapting the relations
of pw and pr to the actual permission bits.
The user-adapted abstract versions of ls, read, and write are simply:
ls(u, p, x) = (pR(u, p, x) ? ls(p, x) : ⊥) ,
read(u, p, x) = (pR(u, p, x) ? x(p) : ⊥) ,
write(u, p,m, x) = (pW (u, p, x) ? write(p,m, x) : x) .
For creation the path must be nonempty and the user needs permission to execute
and write the parent directory. We therefore deﬁne
pY (u, p, x) = pX(u, p, x) ∧ pw(u, p, x) ,
create(u, p, d, x) = (pY (u,parent(p), x) ? create(p, d, x) : x) .
For deletion (assuming the node holds a directory), we require that the directory
at the node is empty and we need ls to verify this. We therefore deﬁne
delete(u, p, x) =
(pW (u,parent(p), x) ∧ ls(u, p, x) = ∅ ? delete(p, x) : x) .
Note that the user u needs read permission to obtain ls(u, p, x) = ∅. Otherwise
function ls yields ⊥, and ⊥ = ∅.
For move, we propose:
move(u, p, q, x) =
(pY (u,parent(p), x) ∧ pW(u,parent(q), x) ? move(p, q, x) : x) .
5.2 Reﬁnement of permissions
We now turn from the abstract stores of section 2 to the total stores of section
3. We extend the permission bit functions px, pr, pw to the type lift[Data] by
deﬁning
px(u,⊥) = pr(u,⊥) = pw(u,⊥) = false .
The lookup function L that gives the ﬁle identiﬁer of a path is now modiﬁed to
verify execution permissions along the path:
L : [User × Path × StoreT → Fid] ,
L(u, p, x) =
( p = ε ? rootId
: px(u, xpp.data) ? xpp.dir(last(p))
: null )
where xpp = x(L(u,parent(p), x)).
This expresses that the user can only traverse a path p if he has rights to execute
all strict ancestors of p. Indeed, under assumption of J0(x) and J1(x), we have
L(u, p, x) =
(p = ε ∨ pX(u,parent(p), abstract(x)) ? L(p, x) : null) .
The proof of this is complicated. The result is at the basis of the theorems that the
reﬁnement function abstract respects (i.e., commutes with) the functions read, ls,
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write, create, delete, move, as deﬁned below.
The user-adapted versions of read and ls are given by
read(u, p, x) =
( L(u, p, x) = null ∨ ¬ pr(u, x(L(u, p, x)).data) ? ⊥
: x(L(u, p, x)).data) ,
ls(u, p, x) =
( L(u, p, x) = null ∨ ¬ pr(u, x(L(u, p, x)).data) ? ⊥
: ls(x(L(u, p, x)).dir) ) .
The user-adapted version of delete becomes:
delete(u, p, x) =
( p = ε ∨ ¬ pw(u, x(pp).data) ∨ ls(u, p, x) = ∅ ? x
: x with [ (pp).dir(last(p)) := null ] )
where pp = L(parent(p), x).
For the sake of brevity, we omit the deﬁnitions of write, create, and move at this
level. Using the invariants J0, . . . , J3, we then prove the reﬁnement theorems for
the user-adapted functions of this level, analogous to those of section 3. All details
are given in the PVS proof script of [7].
5.3 Implementation of permissions
We now turn to the concrete stores of section 4. For the permission system, we
extend the lookup function L of section 4 to verify the execution permissions along
the path:
L : [User × Path × StoreI → Fid] ,
L(u, p, x) = ( p = ε ? rootId
: x(L(u,parent(p), x)) = ⊥
∨ ¬ px(u, x(L(u,parent(p), x)).data)
∨ x(L(u,parent(p), x)).dir(last(p)) = ⊥ ? null
: x(L(u,parent(p), x)).dir(last(p)) ) .
The functions read and ls of section 4 are modiﬁed for the user-adapted version as:
read(u, p, x) =
( x(L(u, p, x)) = ⊥ ∨ ¬ pr(u, x(L(u, p, x)).data) ? ⊥
: x(L(u, p, x)).data) .
ls(u, p, x) =
( x(L(u, p, x)) = ⊥ ∨ ¬ pr(u, x(L(u, p, x)).data) ? ⊥
: ls(x(L(u, p, x)).dir) .
The function write is modiﬁed analogously:
write(p,m, x) =
( x(L(u, p, x)) = ⊥ ∨ ¬ pw(u, x(L(u, p, x))) ? x
: x with [(L(u, p, x)).data := m(x(L(u, p, x)).data)] ) .
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Function create needs permissions for lookup, writing, and executing in the parent
directory:
create(u, p, d, x) =
( x(pp) = ⊥ ∨ L(u, p, x) = null
∨ ¬ px(u, x(pp).data) ∨ ¬ pw(u, x(pp).data) ? x
: x with [ (pp ).dir(last(p)) := ln , (ln) := node(d) ] )
where pp = L(u,parent(p), x) and ln = new(x).
Function delete of section 4 becomes:
delete(u, p, x) =
( p = ε ∨ ls(u, p, x) = ∅
∨ x(pp) = ⊥ ∨ ¬ pw(u, x(pp).data) ? x
: x with [ (pp).dir(last(p)) := ⊥ ] )
where pp = L(parent(p), x).
Here the condition x(pp) = ⊥ is needed to read x(pp).data, because ls(u, p, x) = ∅
only implies x(pp) = ⊥ under assumption of the invariant K0(x).
We adapt function move of section 4 as:
move(u, p, q, x) =
( q = ε ∨ p  q ∨ L(u, p, x) = null ∨ x(qq) = ⊥
∨ ¬ pw(u, x(pp).data) ∨ ¬ pw(u, x(qq).data) ? x
: x with [(qq).dir(last(q)) := L(u, p, x) ,
(pp).dir(last(p)) := ⊥ ] )
where qq = L(u,parent(q), x) and pp = L(u,parent(p), x)
We ﬁnally prove with PVS, that the reﬁnement function from the implemented store
to the total store also respects (i.e., commutes with) the user-adapted versions of
read, write, ls, create, delete, and move. The details of the proof can be found at
[7].
6 Conclusion
In this work, we constructed and proved the speciﬁcations of a hierarchical ﬁle
system. We used functional reﬁnements to model a ﬁle system, starting from an
abstract version and working towards a concrete speciﬁcation. We divided our
work into four parts (i) Abstract model (ii) First reﬁnement using total functions
(iii) Final reﬁnement using partial functions. Finally, (iv), at all three levels, we
incorporated a permission mechanism like that of the UNIX ﬁle system.
Initially, we tried to model ﬁle systems directly at the implementation level of
Section 4. In order to evade or at least postpone the details of partial functions, we
invented the more abstract level of Section 3. The real breakthrough came when we
saw that we had to begin by specifying a hierarchical ﬁle system from a user’s point
of view, as a partial function from (absolute) paths to data. The requirements for
the other two levels then emerged naturally as proof obligations for the reﬁnement
functions. Having the three levels was also very helpful in the development of the
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permission system.
A total of 204 lemmas were proved with proof assistant PVS [6] during this work.
It included 10 lemmas for the abstract model, 87 lemmas for the model with total
functions, 79 lemmas for the model with partial functions, and 28 lemmas shared for
all models. This may be an indication of the eﬃciency of PVS as compared to the
work done in [17] using Athena where they constructed 283 lemmas and theorems
for only reading and writing into ﬁles in only one directory. Details of the PVS
proof can be found in the proof script for this work at [7].
As for directions for future research, the model needs an extension with hard
links. At the abstract level, the appropriate way to do this may be by means of
a modiﬁable equivalence relation on valid paths, as a second component of the
store. Function write should then modify all members of the equivalence class of
the path. A next extension could be to incorporate the diﬀerence between ﬁles and
directories. After this, several problem areas ask for attention: the details of reading
and writing, concurrent access, disk lay-out, distribution, and fault tolerance.
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